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## STAFF NOTES:

**Middle East  
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South Asia**

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## **MIDDLE EAST – AFRICA – SOUTH ASIA**

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Iran

*Students Restive Again*

A new spate of student unrest has affected several Iranian universities during the past month. The disturbances in provincial schools appear to have generally focused on local grievances, but some in Tehran reportedly have had anti-government overtones.

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ten students were arrested and the engineering college at Tehran University closed in late October following riots. National University in Tehran has been the scene of brawls between moderate and "Marxist" students. Police have been able to handle the situation except for a reported incident at Aryamehr University in Tehran where army troops were said to have been called in. A total lack of coverage in Iran's press suggests the usual government censorship of such events.

Student demonstrations in November and December have become an annual feature of Iranian university life. They usually reach a climax around December 7--the date in 1953 when police killed some students in the course of quelling riots. Unrest last year was more serious than usual, beginning in mid-November and lasting well into the spring.

Further unrest is likely this year, but the security forces should be able to handle the situation. When demonstrations occur, government response is usually swift and often forceful; universities are frequently ordered closed.

The Shah also has used the carrot in dealing with students. Student benefits have recently been increased, facilities expanded, and administrative and faculty reforms promised. In addition, teachers and school administrators, anxious to keep students happy and avoid riots on their campuses, adopt lax attitudes toward academic performance and class attendance. Thus far, neither buying students' loyalty or cracking heads has proved effective in preventing demonstrations. (SECRET NOFORN)

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Somalia

### Siad Sounds Downbeat Note

Opening a meeting of regional and district administrators in Mogadiscio on November 5, Somali President Siad chose to throw away his usual rosy speech about the accomplishments of his "revolution" and to talk tough to his audience.

Siad admitted that in the six years since the revolution things have not worked out as planned in Somalia. He laid the blame to a lack of understanding of "scientific socialism" and the failure of leaders to accept their responsibilities. He said that a good deal of the blame was on regional and district officials who have had "unnecessary doubts" and permitted inefficient administration.

The Somali leader admitted that the government had been unsuccessful in rooting out tribalism, regionalism, and nepotism. Somalis have also, he said, not attained a sufficiently high level of "political awareness." He warned "reactionaries and the ignorant" not to interpret the recent amnesty of old regime politicians as a sign of weakness on the part of his government. Siad concluded by saying that the time for preaching had ended and threatening to punish those opposing his policies. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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Kenya

*Kenyatta on Top*

President Jomo Kenyatta has regained much of the authority he lost in the aftermath of the adverse reaction last March to the murder of J. M. Kariuki, a leading critic of the regime. He has not regained the popularity he formerly enjoyed with the Kenyan public, however. At the same time, the prospects that Vice President Moi will be elected as Kenyatta's successor have diminished.

Kenyatta has put down the assertive role parliament adopted last summer by arresting two of his most persistent critics under his broad internal security powers and by meting out harsh reprisals on several others. On October 24, he addressed a Nairobi University audience for the first time in a year; there were no demonstrations from the students, who had viewed Kariuki as a champion of the changes they espoused for Kenyan society. Last summer, student disorders resulted in scores of students being injured and over a hundred arrested. The press, which gave extensive coverage to antigovernment news during the summer, has been bullied into modifying its critical stance.

In reasserting his authority, Kenyatta has probably intensified tribal divisions. Moreover, there appears to be widespread dissatisfaction in all but the most favored sectors of Kenyan society as a result of reports that the Kenyatta family has amassed great wealth and engaged in corrupt activities. Many land-hungry Kenyans are aware that Kenyatta, his wife, and several family members have acquired real estate and been involved in unsavory deals in ivory, charcoal, and minerals.

Kenyatta is determined to ensure that the regime which succeeds his will not disturb the favored position the family or the southern branch of the Kikuyu tribe. He faces a major obstacle because of the absence within his inner circle of any individual

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who is both capable and can win the support of southern Kikuyu leaders and outsiders.

The southern Kikuyu inner circle includes:

-- Minister of State Mbiyu Koinange, a brother-in-law and confidant of Kenyatta. He is one of the most hated men in Kenya; in a succession government he might continue to play an extremely important behind-the-scenes role.

-- Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki, a nephew of Kenyatta. He is industrious and has won public favor by moving Kenya's foreign policy closer to that of other African countries; his standing with Kenyatta is not clear.

-- Njoroge Mungai, also a nephew of Kenyatta, was given an appointive seat in parliament after being defeated in the 1974 election. Although Mungai, a former foreign minister, [REDACTED] appears to lack leadership qualities, Kenyatta looks to him to look out for the family's interests and may be considering him as a successor.

-- Defense Minister James Gichuru. He is probably over the hill as far as succession is concerned; [REDACTED]

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At one time it appeared that Kenyatta and the inner circle favored Vice President Daniel arap Moi as the successor, believing they could use him as a front man. As a non-Kikuyu, Moi was expected to draw support from a broader segment of the population than could any member of the inner circle. Moi has grown in stature in the eyes of many Kenyans, however, and Kenyatta and his associates may have decided he no longer fits their requirements. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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